Unless one has been living on a desert island without newspapers, cellular service, or access to the Internet for the past few years, one would understand that the rising costs of health care and its impact on the current and future economic status of the United States have been a significant factor in guiding our domestic policy agenda. During the 2008 Presidential campaign, the candidates were challenged to articulate their proposals for health reform in the middle of the worst economic recession since the Great Depression.

The candidates’ approach to addressing an environment where many working families were without medical insurance or had burdensome medical expenses could not have been more different. Over the decade, cumulative increases in health insurance premiums were more than 130%, greatly outstripping a 38% increase in workers’ earnings that was offset by a 28% increase in inflation. While both candidates proposed plans to reform the health insurance system while improving the quality and efficiency of care, Obama’s proposal for private-public group insurance with a shared responsibility for financing significantly differed from McCain’s proposal to encourage individual market coverage through the use of tax incentives and deregulation. The fundamental differences between the Republican and Democratic proposals are summarized in Table 1 .

One problem with our current payment system is that physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers are financially incented to deliver more services to more people (volume-driven), but that the payment systems do not recognize efforts to improve health (value-driven). Current systems which assume that all providers have equivalent quality fail to encourage the use of high-value providers. Our fee-for-service payment system is not designed to bundle the services of different providers into a single-episode payment, even if all of those services are integral parts of a patient’s total episode of care. Thus, most discussions about health care payment reform have focused on methods for paying providers—medical homes, episode-based payment, and comprehensive care payments—whose goal is to avoid providing unnecessary services within any particular episode of care. An episode payment is a single price for all of the services needed by a patient for an entire episode of care (eg, colorectal cancer screening). Comprehensive care payment, also referred to as risk-adjusted global fees or condition-adjusted capitation, is a population-based approach whereby a single price is paid for all of the health care services needed by a specific group of people for a fixed period of time. While there are advantages and disadvantages to different payment methods and incentives, one must keep in mind that if the payment level is below the cost of providing care, providers will be unable to provide quality care.

Along with concerns about costs has been a focus on patient value. While the goals may be to improve the quality, safety, efficiency, and value of care, the current focus has been on pay-for-performance, value-driven health care, and public reporting of quality and cost information. Pay-for-performance programs from Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial payors have been uncoordinated, and process reporting may not be clearly aligned with producing better outcomes for patients. Although steps have been taken to align quality and value efforts with improving care for patients, payment for high-quality, efficient care that rewards achievement of improved patient outcomes over episodes of care while minimizing the opportunity for unintended negative consequences requires reform of payment methodologies.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. Following the enactment of Public Law 111-148, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-152) (enacted on March 30, 2010), amended certain provisions of Public Law 111-148. These public laws are collectively known as the Affordable Care Act. The Affordable Care Act includes several provisions designed to improve the quality of Medicare services, support innovation and the establishment of new payment models in the program, better align Medicare payments with provider costs, strengthen program integrity within Medicare, and put Medicare on a firmer financial footing.

There are several provisions in the Affordable Care Act that will affect gastroenterology. Section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act amended Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (the Act) (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.) by adding new section 1899 to the Act to establish a Shared Savings Program that promotes accountability for a patient population, coordinates items and services under Parts A and B, and encourages investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high-quality and efficient service delivery. Section 1899(a)(1) of the Act requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish this program no later than January 1, 2012. Section 1899(a)(1)(A) of the Act further provides that “groups of providers of services and suppliers meeting criteria specified by the Secretary may work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through an [ACO]” (Accountable Care Organization). Section 1899(a)(1)(B) of the Act also provides that ACOs that meet quality performance standards established by the Secretary are eligible to receive payments for “shared savings.” On March 31, 2011 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released a notice of proposed rulemaking for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which would allow eligible providers, hospitals, and suppliers to voluntarily participate in the Shared Savings Program by creating or joining an ACO. While the proposed rule allowed specialists to participate in multiple ACOs, whether organized by primary care physicians and/or hospitals, the rule did not allow specialists to organize ACOs.

One might anticipate that while specialists will initially be paid under a fee-for-service methodology in an ACO, payment could transition to a methodology around episodes of care such as colorectal cancer screening, viral hepatitis, inflammatory bowel disease, esophageal disorders, metabolic disorders, and malnutrition. Payment could be based on a formula combining fee-for-service payments and achieving definable outcomes, such as the percentage of the population receiving colorectal cancer screening and the physician’s adherence to multispecialty consensus guidelines around intervals for follow-up surveillance. When the ACO is financially responsible for the health of a population, the question is not whether the all-in price of the colonoscopy (endoscopist, facility, pathology, sedation, pharmaceuticals, and complications) is $1000 or $5000; it is whether the service needs to be purchased at all. Thus, one question for gastroenterologists is whether they wish to be at the end of the food chain dependent on referrals for screening colonoscopy, or whether they wish to advance to the head of the food chain by assuming responsibility for the rate of colorectal cancer screening in the population served, choosing to deploy the variety of noninvasive and invasive screening methods based on the individualized need by each patient.

The current Medicare payment system includes one payment for the facility and one payment for the physician. Because payment is unique to each site of service, providers do not have financial incentives to provide care that will reduce costs in other locations. Bundling refers to the policy of linking payment for services to an entire episode of care. Section 3023 as amended by Section 10308 requires the Secretary to develop, test, and evaluate Medicare payment methodologies through a voluntary pilot program for integrated care to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services. This “bundled payment” program requires the establishment of a national pilot program on payment bundling for the Medicare program by January 1, 2013 and a Medicaid bundling demonstration program by 2012, and may be expanded after January 1, 2016 if the Secretary determines that expansion would reduce spending without reducing the quality of care, and would not deny or limit coverage or provision of benefits for beneficiaries. In conducting the pilot program, the Secretary will test alternative payment methods, which may include bundled payments and include payment for services such as care coordination, medication reconciliation, discharge planning, transitional care services, and other patient-centered activities. The demonstration sets the episode of care to begin 3 days before the hospital admission and end 30 days following hospital discharge. Bundled payments would cover the costs of acute-care inpatient services, physician services delivered in and outside of an acute-care hospital setting, outpatient hospital services including emergency department services, and post–acute-care services. One could foresee where this proposal could affect payment when a patient suffers a complication, such as a perforation or bleeding after an index endoscopic procedure.

Section 3002 of the Act describes improvements to the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), as modified by Section 10327. Eligible professionals (EP) who successfully report quality data will receive a 1.0% bonus in 2011 and a 0.5% bonus in years 2012 through 2014. EPs who do not successfully report quality data will have their Medicare payments reduced by 1.5% in 2015 and 2.0% in 2016 and each subsequent year. The payment incentives and reductions are based on the Medicare fee schedule amounts for all covered services furnished by the EP. This section also increases the PQRS incentive payment by 0.5% for years 2011 to 2014 for EPs for whom required quality data is submitted for a year on their behalf by a qualified American Board of Medical Specialists Maintenance of Certification (MOC) or equivalent program that meets the criteria for a registry; and which, more frequently than is required for board certification, participate in a MOC and complete a qualified MOC practice assessment. For years after 2014, the Secretary can incorporate participation in an MOC program and successful completion of a qualified MOC program practice assessment into the composite of measures of quality of care for the purposes of the physician fee schedule value-based payment modifier, as outlined in Section 3007.

Sections 3001 (Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program), 3004 (Quality Reporting Requirements for Long-Term Care Hospitals, Inpatient Rehabilitation Hospitals, Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitals and Hospice Program), 3006 (Skilled Nursing Facility, Home Health Agency and Ambulatory Surgical Center Value-Based Purchasing Program), 3007 (Value-Based Payment Modifier Under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule), 10322 (Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement), and 10326 (Medicare Pay-For-Performance Pilot Program) of the Act advance several new payment and delivery system proposals to promote value-based purchasing in the Medicare program. On January 7, 2011, CMS released a proposed rule to implement a hospital value-based purchasing program, which would apply to payments for discharges occurring on or after October 1, 2012, and would reward with higher payments hospitals that score well on quality care measures. The proposal includes quality measures around surgical care activities, health care–associated infections, and patient perceptions of care.

Section 3007, the Value-Based Purchasing Modifier, provides for the Secretary to implement a budget-neutral payment system that adjusts the Medicare physician fee schedule based on the quality and cost of the care delivered, including geographically standardized risk adjustments for quality and cost measures. The system will be phased in over a 2-year period beginning January 1, 2015. The modifier is separate from and does not replace the geographic adjustment factors, and should promote systems-based care. The Secretary is directed to establish a composite of appropriate risk-based measures of quality, which must be submitted to the National Quality Forum for endorsement. In addition, the Secretary will establish a composite of appropriate measures of costs.

By 2017, episode-based cost measures developed using the public Medicare-specific episode grouper software also may be considered in developing a composite score. An “episode grouper” is software that organizes claims data into clinically coherent episodes of care across different providers, which includes all contacts with the health care system for a specific health problem between a start and end point, and will allow CMS to compare risk-adjusted costs of care for similar patients across physicians. Section 1848(n)(9)(A) of the Act, as added by Section 3003 of the Affordable Care Act, requires the development, by not later than January 1, 2012, of a Medicare-specific episode grouper so that physicians can be compared on episode-based costs of care. The episode grouper will require further testing and refinement to see how well it integrates with other parameters, such as attribution and benchmarking, before it can be fully operational. The episode grouper is being developed to determine episode-based costs for a subset of selected high-cost, high-volume conditions for Medicare beneficiaries.

On July 1, 2011, CMS released the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Proposed Rule for CY 2012, where they identified proposed quality of care measures for the Value-Based Modifier. For purposes of Section 1848(p)(4)(A)(i) of the Act, CMS proposes to use performance on: (1) the measures in the core set of the PQRS for 2012; (2) all measures in the Group Practice Reporting Option (GPRO) of the Physician Quality Reporting System for 2012; and (3) the core measures, alternate core, and 38 additional measures in the Electronic Health Record Incentive Program measures for 2012. While CMS has requested input on quality measures that assess the care provided by specialists, the proposal includes several measures that could be reported by gastroenterologists, including:

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  110: Influenza immunization

  
  
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  111: Pneumococcal vaccination

  
  
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  113: Colorectal cancer screening

  
  
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  128: Body mass index screening and follow-up

  
  
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  239: Weight assessment and counseling for children and adolescents

  
  
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  226: Tobacco use screening and cessation intervention

  
  
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  237: Blood pressure measurement

  
  
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  TBD: Proportion of patients (18+) who have had their blood pressure measured in the past 2 years

  
  
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  46: Medication reconciliation after discharge from inpatient facility.

Section 3006(f) of the Act, as added by Section 10301(a), requires the Secretary to develop a plan to implement a value-based purchasing (VBP) program for payments under the Medicare program for ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs). Gastroenterology is the top Specialty category by volume for ASC claims, constituting 32.7% of claims in CY 2009, and endoscopic procedures (esophagogastroduodenoscopy [EGD] with biopsy, colonoscopy with biopsy, diagnostic colonoscopy) constitute 3 of the top 5 surgical procedures by volume. In the proposed rule that would update the hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) and ASC payment system for 2012, CMS is now proposing to implement a quality reporting system under which data collection would begin in 2012. For the first 2 years, ASCs would not be financially penalized for failure to report quality information. However, beginning in 2014, CMS would begin reducing Medicare payments to ASCs that fail to report data on specified quality measures. For 2015, CMS has proposed to collect ASC volume data on selected ASC procedures. Both surgeon volume and facility volume are correlated with surgical outcomes and that higher volumes correspond to better performance. These data and analyses are specific to discrete surgical procedures. For the ASC procedure volume measure, CMS proposes collecting and reporting surgical volume not for specific procedures, but across a range of procedure codes that will be aggregated and reported by broad categories. It is not clear, however, that the same statistical relationships exist when procedure-specific data are aggregated into much broader categories. CMS is soliciting comments on the inclusion of procedure-specific measures for colonoscopy and endoscopy, and for measures of anesthesia-related complications.

The most significant challenge to gastroenterology is the question of whether physician payments are appropriate. Medicare pays for physician services based on a list of services and their payment rates, called the physician fee schedule. In determining payment rates for each service on the fee schedule, CMS considers the amount of work required to provide a service, expenses related to maintaining a practice, and liability insurance costs. The values given to these 3 types of resources are adjusted by variations in the input prices in different markets, then a total is multiplied by a standard dollar amount, called the fee schedule’s conversion factor, to arrive at the payment amount. Medicare’s payment rates may be adjusted based on provider characteristics, additional geographic designations, and other factors. The conversion factor updates payments for physician services every year according to a formula called the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system. This formula is intended to keep spending growth (a function of service volume growth) consistent with growth in the national economy. However, in the last several years, Congress has specified an update outside of the SGR formula.

Under the fee schedule payment system, payment rates are based on relative weights, called relative value units (RVUs), which account for the relative costliness of the inputs used to provide physician services: physician work, practice expenses, and professional liability insurance (PLI) expenses. The RVUs for physician work reflect the relative levels of time, effort, skill, and stress associated with providing each service. The RVUs for practice expense are based on the expenses physicians incur when they rent office space, buy supplies and equipment, and hire nonphysician clinical and administrative staff. The PLI RVUs are based on the premiums physicians pay for professional liability/medical malpractice insurance.

In calculating payment rates, each of the 3 RVUs is adjusted to reflect the price level for related inputs in the local market where the service is furnished. Separate geographic practice cost indexes (GPCIs) are used for this purpose. The fee schedule payment amount is then determined by summing the adjusted weights and multiplying the total by the fee schedule conversion factor. For most physician services, Medicare pays the provider 80% of the fee schedule amount. The beneficiary is liable for the remaining 20% coinsurance.

In the CY 2011 Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule, CMS solicited public comments on possible approaches and methodologies for a validation process. As discussed in the CY 2011 Physician Fee Schedule final rule, several commentators were skeptical that there could be viable alternative methods to the existing American Medical Association’s (AMA) Relative Value Update Committee (RUC) code review process for validating physician time and intensity that would preserve the appropriate relativity of specific physician’s services under the current payment system, urging CMS to rely solely on the RUC to provide valuations for services. However, others expressed support for the development and establishment of a system-wide validation process of the work RVUs. Other alternatives included the use of time and motion studies to validate estimates of physician time and intensity, and the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) suggested “collecting data on a recurring basis from a cohort of practices and other facilities where physicians and nonphysician clinical practitioners work.”

Section 3134 of the Affordable Care Act requires the Secretary to periodically review and identify potentially misvalued codes and make appropriate adjustments to their relative values, including services that have experienced high growth rates. Section 3134(a) of the Affordable Care Act added a new section, 1848(c)(2)(K) of the Act, that requires the Secretary to periodically identify potentially misvalued services using certain criteria, and to review and make appropriate adjustments to the relative values for those services. Section 3134(a) of the Affordable Care Act also added a new section, 1848(c)(2)(L) of the Act, which requires the Secretary to develop a validation process to validate the RVUs of certain potentially misvalued codes under the physician fee schedule, identified using the same categorical criteria used to identify potentially misvalued codes, and to make appropriate adjustments. The validation process may include validation of work elements (such as time, mental effort and professional judgment, technical skill and physical effort, and stress due to risk) involved with furnishing a service and may include validation of the preservice, postservice, and intraservice components of work. The Secretary is directed to validate a sampling of the work RVUs of codes identified through any of the 7 categories of potentially misvalued codes specified by Section 1848(c)(2)(K)(ii) of the Act. In the Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule for 2012, CMS proposes “to consolidate the formal Five-Year Review of Work and PE [practice expense] with the annual review of potentially misvalued codes.” CMS would begin meeting the statutory requirement to review work and PE RVUs for potentially misvalued codes at least once every 5 years through an annual process, rather than once every 5 years. Furthermore, CMS has proposed a process by which the public could submit codes for potential review, which would be incorporated into their potentially misvalued codes initiative. The validation process may include validation of work elements (such as time, mental effort and professional judgment, technical skill and physical effort, and stress due to risk) involved with furnishing a service and may include validation of the pre-, post-, and intraservice components of work.

CMS emphasizes the need to review codes that are identified as part of the potentially misvalued initiative to ensure that appropriate relativity is constructed and maintained in several key relationships: that work and PE RVUs of codes are ranked appropriately within the code family; that work and PE RVUs of codes are appropriately relative based on comparison of physician time and/or intensity and/or direct inputs to other services furnished by physicians in the same specialty; and that work and PE RVUs of codes are appropriately relative when compared with services across specialties. What this means for gastroenterology is that all of our endoscopy codes could be targeted for review between now and 2013. CMS will look at the procedure times to ensure that relativity is appropriately constructed and maintained within a family of codes. This review may bring to the forefront the question of whether there is a difference in procedure time between those who administer their own sedation for average-risk patients undergoing endoscopic procedures and those who use sedation administered by an anesthesia professional.

Several codes that affect gastroenterology have already been identified by CMS for review by the RUC. In the CY 2011 Physician Fee Schedule final rule, CMS requested that the societies survey codes 43239 (EGD/biopsy), 45330 (flexible sigmoidoscopy), 45380 (colonoscopy/biopsy), and 45385 (colonoscopy/polypectomy). As a result of the fastest growing services screen, in May 2011 the RUC asked the gastrointestinal societies to explain the growth in services of codes 43259 (EGD with endoscopic ultrasound [EUS]), 43242 (EGD, EUS with fine-needle aspiration), 43236 (EGD with injection), and 45381 (colonoscopy with injection). In the Five-Year Review of Work Relative Value Units Under the Physician Fee Schedule published on June 6, 2011, CMS asks for a review of the ERCP (endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography) code family. In the Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule for 2012, CMS asks the societies to review the physician work and practice expense of codes 43235 (EGD), 45378 (colonoscopy), 96413 (chemotherapy administration, intravenous infusion, up to 1 hour), and 88305 (Level IV—surgical pathology, gross and microscopic examination), noting that because these codes have significant impact on physician fee schedule payment on a specialty level, a review of the relativity of the code to ensure that the work and PE RVUs are appropriately relative within the specialty and across specialties is essential.

In the proposed rule for 2012, CMS has also requested that the RUC conduct a comprehensive review of all evaluation and management (E/M) codes. Noting the significant interest in delivery system reform, such as patient-centered medical homes and making the primary care physician the focus of managing the patient’s chronic conditions, CMS believes the focus of primary care has evolved from an episodic treatment–based orientation to a focus on comprehensive patient-centered care management to meet the challenges of preventing and managing chronic disease.

Section 3403(b) of the Affordable Care Act establishes an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) “to extend Medicare solvency and reduce spending growth through the use of a spending target system and fast-track legislative approval process.” This Board must submit recommendations to Congress, beginning in 2014, to reduce the growth of Medicare expenditures while maintaining or improving the quality of care delivered. The Board is to be composed of 15 members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. By April 30 of each year—beginning in 2013—the CMS Office of the Actuary will project whether Medicare’s per-capita spending growth rate in the following 2 years will exceed a targeted rate. If future Medicare spending is expected to exceed the targets, the IPAB will propose recommendations to Congress and the President to reduce the growth rate. The IPAB’s first set of recommendations would be proposed on January 15, 2014 and would be implemented on January 1, 2015. If Congress fails to pass legislation by August 15 of each year to achieve the required savings through other policy changes, the IPAB’s recommendations will automatically take effect. Hospitals and hospices will not be subject to cost reductions proposed by the IPAB from 2015 through 2019. Beginning July 1, 2014, the IPAB must also submit an annual report providing information on system-wide health care costs; patient access to care; utilization; and quality of care that allows comparison by region, types of services, types of providers, and payers—both private insurers and Medicare. It is clear that to achieve the required savings, the obvious option will be for the IPAB to make recommendations that would decrease physician payments.

Section 6301 of the Affordable Care Act amends the Social Security Act (42 USC 1301et seq.) to add a new Part D on comparative clinical effectiveness research. Comparative clinical effectiveness research means research that evaluates and compares the patient health outcomes and benefits of 2 or more medical treatments or services. Such treatment and services are defined broadly to include protocols for treatment, care management, and delivery; procedures; diagnostic tools; medical devices; therapeutics; and any other strategies used to treat, diagnose, or prevent illness or injury. This process establishes the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI), responsible for the identification, prioritization, and execution of such comparative effectiveness research. The PCORI is structured as a tax-exempt independent government corporation overseen by a board of governors, responsible for setting national clinical comparative effectiveness research priorities and directed to enter into contracts to manage the funding and conduct of research. The PCORI will be responsible for establishing a standing research methodologies committee to develop standards for clinical comparative effectiveness, but the PCORI will conduct no research itself. The PCORI is required to appoint advisory panels that are expert in performing randomized clinical trials under the PCORI’s research project agenda, and to appoint an expert advisory panel for purposes of assisting in the design of research studies and in determining the value and feasibility of conducting research studies for rare diseases. Measures will be developed to assess quality through comparative effectiveness, but also to assess value, which will likely include an evaluation of comparative cost and patient compliance factors, such as treatment regimen and unpleasant or harmful side effects. Research will be funded by the newly established Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF), which will receive appropriations from private insurance–based taxes. PCORI offers an opportunity for physicians and medical device manufacturers to demonstrate the benefits of their interventions in specific subpopulations, which may lead to coverage and reimbursement.

Section 3021 creates a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test payment and service delivery models that reduce costs while preserving or enhancing the quality of care. The Secretary may limit model testing to certain geographic areas, and model designs do not initially have to ensure budget neutrality. The Innovation Center “evaluate[s] each model on the quality of care furnished and the changes in spending,” and its mandate provides great flexibility in selecting and testing innovative payment and service delivery models. It also allows the Secretary to expand, through rule making, the scope and duration of models proven effective after evaluation, including implementation on a nationwide basis. To expand a model, the Secretary must determine that the model improves the quality of patient care, and the CMS Actuary must certify that expanding the program will lower costs (or at least not increase costs).

One of the Innovation Center’s initial proposals is the Pioneer ACO Model, which is designed for health care organizations and providers that are already experienced in coordinating care for patients across care settings. This model will allow these provider groups to move more rapidly from a shared savings payment model to a population-based payment model on a track consistent with, but separate from, the Medicare Shared Savings Program. It is designed to work in coordination with private payers by aligning provider incentives, which will improve quality and health outcomes for patients across the ACO, and achieve cost savings for Medicare, employers, and patients. The payment models being tested in the first 2 years of the Pioneer ACO Model are a shared savings payment policy with generally higher levels of shared savings and risk for Pioneer ACOs than levels currently proposed in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. In year 3 of the program, participating ACOs that have shown a specified level of savings over the first 2 years will be eligible to move a substantial portion of their payments to a population-based model.

In this era of challenges to reimbursement and change, what is a gastroenterologist to do? First is to recognize that one’s success will depend on creating a system of learning through practice redesign that incorporates systems engineering tools, team-based care, and electronic medical record functionality. Leadership, governance, and culture-aligned incentives are critical, because those who have figured out how to manage internal variation will come out ahead. Second is to take a critical look at how one’s practice operates. Are you operating in an efficient manner? Have you looked critically at “who does what” to maximize your margins? Have you assessed your referral sources to determine which ones are likely to be bought by a hospital or medical group? Have you reviewed your referrals to see who your top payors are by referring physicians, the contribution of each payor to gross revenues, and the impact if there is a shift in referral sources? Third is to recognize that we are moving toward a gastroenterology outcomes set whereby we will be measured on how our efforts improve the patient’s experience of care, encouraging better health for populations while reducing costs. We will be measured on our colorectal cancer screening rates and surveillance intervals, adherence with preventive measures, improvement in patient safety, reduction in infections and other complications, and compliance with evidence-based care for gastrointestinal conditions including hepatitis, inflammatory bowel disease, obesity, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and dyspepsia. The National Quality Forum has already considered, and declined to endorse, quality measures based solely on documentation of endoscopic procedures. Fourth, gastroenterologists should consider that what worked in the past might not necessarily be the formula for success in this decade. In an era of comprehensive care payments, collaboration—not competition—may be the mantra for success. Gastroenterologists should be prepared to measure and report on what they do, and remain open to exploring how joint ventures with hospitals and risk-bearing medical groups may position them to thrive, not just survive, in the future.